

GERMANY AND THE CHALLENGE OF MASS IMMIGRATION

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Abstract. *This article gives an insight into the problematic origins of the term multiculturalism, a brief summary of integration of foreigners in Germany by presenting certain debates about incorporation, assimilation and dominant culture in order to ultimately see the critique of the model of multiculturalism.*

Keywords: *multiculturalism, integration, disintegration, assimilation, pluralism, mass immigration.*

Considering the two and a half decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall and German unification, the Federal Republic of Germany is still undergoing major political, societal and demographical changes. Taking into account the events of the last two years regarding refugee crisis, one remarks that the entire German society is heavily loaded and not only because of economic considerations, but also national security reasons thus, threat and fear from terrorism. If somebody has doubts so far that Germany is a country of immigration it must confront the reality. Chancellor Angela Merkel declared six years earlier on Saturday (16/10/2010) at the Germany Day (Deutschlandtag) of the Young Union (Junge Union Deutschlands) in Potsdam that the multicultural society "has failed, absolutely failed".¹ However, it is a justifiable requirement that most of the immigrants learned the German language in order to have better opportunities on the employment market. Forced marriages are unacceptable, and

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¹ "This approach has failed, absolutely failed." Source:
<http://www.dw.com/de/merkel-erklaert-multikulti-f%C3%BCr-gescheitert/a-6118143>

naturally also girls from migrant families must be allowed to go with on school excursions. At the same time is necessary to ensure, that criminal acts become sentenced rapidly and there should be no city districts, in which even the police did not dares to enter. Merkel also defended (even within coalition parties) the controversial statement of the German President Christian Wulff, according to which the Islam religion is a component part of Germany. The chancellor continued her argumentation by referring to the ethnic Turkish goal scorers in German national football team, which can be recognised not only on the football players as (Mesut) Özil, but other performers as well. A couple of days earlier at the Regional Conference of the CDU in Berlin, the Chancellor also stated that Christian values are important: "We feel interconnected to the Christian image of humanity. That is what defines us." If somebody cannot accept this development "he is out of place with us". The Bavarian Governor and CSU leader Horst Seehofer addressed foreigners living in Germany to integrate on the eve of the Congress of the Young Union. The people who live here ought to acknowledge the German core culture. In Seehofer's view, integration means: to respect Christian principles, to get the right qualifications for life and to integrate, but without fluency in German language, this could not be accomplished. We shall not encourage the idea becoming the social welfare office for the whole world - warned the CSU leader and shouted: "Multiculturalism is dead!"² Seehofer received great applause for his speech.

Martin Schrader,³ the Secretary General of Central Council of Jews in Germany criticized Seehofer for his close-minded remarks concerning integration of migrants. Following this, Stephan J. Kramer, declared to the "Rheinpfalz am Sonntag" that the readiness to catch more votes, which goes with xenophobic and other social peace threatening statements and is also connected to incorrect assertions, declined considerably even amongst politicians of democratic parties. "That is not just seedy but downright irresponsible." Before his participation at the

² For this section please visit: <http://www.dw.com/de/merkel-erkl%C3%A4rt-multikulti-f%C3%BCr-gescheitert/a-6118143>

³ He is the author of the article „Merkel erklärt "Multikulti" für gescheitert" by Deutsche Welle (Redaction: Pia Gram).Source: <http://www.dw.com/de/merkel-erkl%C3%A4rt-multikulti-f%C3%BCr-gescheitert/a-6118143>

Germany Day of the Young Union within an interview Seehofer said that immigrants from other cultural backgrounds like Turkey and Arab countries would generate difficulties in integrating themselves in German society. Following this, he concluded, "that we do not need additional migration from other cultural backgrounds." Furthermore, at the Regional Conference of the CDU, Merkel clearly accused the previous governments for existing problems in integrating compact communities with migratory background. "The failures of 30 or 40 years cannot be caught up so rapidly." What the politician did not mention here is that since the recruitment of Italian workers in 1955 by the Federal Government there were so far no real official concepts in order to integrate people speaking non-German languages.

It is noticeable that the concept of multiculturalism is interpreted quite differently even by leading politicians, but not only as there are clear variations on the definitions even among experts. Thus, explanations on multiculturalism are highly context-dependent if politicians are giving declarations through the media and scientific definitions of the concept are depending on the field of study of each researcher. In view of that, it is to observe that the issue is quite complex and at the same time there are a range of meanings today. Some people perceive it as enriching experience, others not at all. Accordingly, the term is interpreted in two different ways: certain persons are convinced that this is the best possible way of co-existence in a pluralist society; the others are using the notion in order to draw attention to the particular risks arising of immigration. Multikulturalismus is also shortened with "Multikulti" in the German language, which is very current at the present in the domestic media. The word itself derives from the English (multiculturalism) and emerged in the 1960s, first in Canada and later also in the mediated political discussions of other big receiving countries including Australia and the United States.

The German Federal Agency for Civic Education⁴ defines it as fact that modern societies are multicultural due to their free, democratic and open systems (constitutionality). Furthermore, multiculturalism denotes therefore the political demand to find

⁴ In German Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung or the "bpb" as it is referred to in short. Source: <http://www.bpb.de/die-bpb/138852/federal-agency-for-civic-education>

standard solutions for cultural, religious, ethnical and linguistic integration of immigrants in host countries. It also includes those tools by which people from diverse backgrounds and lifestyles respectfully cohabitate and in this way they are able to learn and benefit from each other. This can only happen by means of mutual respect, appreciation and tolerance. Under the definition of multiculturalism there are two other related words proposed to contemplate. These are pluralism and subculture.⁵ The term "multicultural society" played for the first time an important role within socio-educational and religious debates at the end of the 70s in the German media. Since the late 80s it was increasingly implemented in the mainstream frame with a view to policy on foreigners as an alternative to various nationalist trends. Therefore, it is an accepted reality by now in Germany that a society is considered culturally diverse, if it consists of people with different native languages, various traditions and religions. Besides, by considering the denotations of the term multiculturalism within German contextual frameworks it is necessary to observe that the notion itself was never imbedded into a socio-political concept neither in the GDR nor in West Germany. The term has been used rather unclearly and its meanings were drifting apart in several directions by ending in disjointed folkloristic interpretations. According to certain current accounts one has to drop the (concept-free) term of multiculturalism on the ash heap of history of the 21st century. If doing so, one could ask: wherewith shall it be replaced? This question is not easily to be answered. Therefore, author of this writing summarises the backgrounds of the political movement called "Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident"⁶ (abbreviated as Pegida or PEGIDA) that occurred in Germany.

In this way it becomes possible to examine carefully how currently the main topic about the model of a pluralistic society reoccurred in scientific and public discussions in Germany. Lutz Bachmann is one of the key players of the Pegida and as a model of the name for his new movement he mentioned campaign

⁵<http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/lexika/politiklexikon/17871/multikulturalismus> In: Schubert, Klaus/Martina Klein, 2011.

⁶ <http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article135158246/Islamfeinde-protestieren-als-Duegida-in-Duesseldorf.html>. In: *Die Welt*, 8. Dezember 2014.

posters of the CDU from the 1960s with the motto "Save the Western culture". Interestingly, only a couple of months after the first Pegida rally, there is already a comprehensive review about the happenings and the origins of the movement. The social-scientific study also provides facts about the structure of the German society. Authors are employees of the Göttingen Institute for the Study of Democracy (Göttinger Institut für Demokratieforschung) and they visited the rallies organized by Pegida in Dresden. Lars Geiges,⁷ Stine Marg,⁸ Franz Walter⁹ and associates succeeded to gather relevant data from several participants of online platforms, group discussions and in situ interviews by using a mixture of journalistic methods. Researchers applied conventional surveys, as well. Those questioned were mostly male, unaffiliated with any religion, possessed a good to very good qualification and sympathized mainly with the newly founded party "Alternative for Germany" (German: Alternative für Deutschland or shortened as AfD).

This was founded in 2012 by a group of economists aiming to address people who were disappointed with conventional politics, mainly Chancellor Angela Merkel's open-door strategy which allowed more than a million migrants to enter the federal country in 2015. AfD won 4.7% of the votes in the 2013 federal elections, narrowly missing the 5% electoral threshold to sit in the Bundestag. However, the party won 7.1% of

⁷ Lars Geiges was born in 1981 and he is a journalist and political scientist (doctorate in social science). He works as research associate at Göttingen Institute for the Study of Democracy and is editorial board member of INDES. The journal deals with political and social issues. The main research areas are (civil) protest movements, social conflicts and engagement and participation. Source: <http://www.transcript-verlag.de/978-3-8376-3192-0/Pegida>

⁸ Stine Marg was born in 1983 and she is an employee at the Göttingen Institute for the Study of Democracy and co-editor of the BP (exhaustive societal study). She has a doctorate in social sciences by doing research primarily in the field of political culture and among other issues she deals with civil protests. Source: <http://www.transcript-verlag.de/978-3-8376-3192-0/Pegida>

⁹ Franz Walter was born in 1956 (Professor of Politics) and since 2000, he is the head of the Institute for the Study of Democracy in Göttingen. He is the editor of INDES and his main research subjects are: political parties and political culture. Walter has several publications concerning especially the history and development of the German parties. Moreover, he writes to SPIEGEL ONLINE on a regular basis. Source: <http://www.transcript-verlag.de/978-3-8376-3192-0/Pegida>

the votes and 7 out of 96 German seats in the European election in 2014 and subsequently joined the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group. New directions of the party were reinforced by their current leaders as Jörg Meuthen and Frauke Petry.¹⁰ Meuthen¹¹ is a German economist and politician serving as Federal spokesman for the AfD since July 2015. Frauke Petry is a research chemist and entrepreneur who only entered the political scene seriously around 2013. Petry has had a positive effect on the chances of Germany's fragmented far-right movements, broadening the popularity of the party by achieving unprecedented success in regional elections of (spring) 2016. According to projections made by the German media (ARD and ZDF) with most districts counted, the only three-year-old AfD - that has principally mobilised against Chancellor Merkel's open-borders policy - won 15.1% of the vote in the federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, about 12.5% in Rhineland-Palatinate and 24% in Saxony-Anhalt, where it finished on second place.¹² The latest results on the AfD of Baden-Wuerttemberg are even more astonishing as this is a successful western state that is home to famous trademarks like Bosch, Porsche or Mercedes. That overall good electoral accomplishments of the new party, which surprised and shocked in equal measure the country in 2016 was largely attributed to Frauke Petry's strategy as she seized control of AfD in July 2015 from its eurosceptic core-members and re-organized it as a vehicle for Germany's growing anti-immigrant reactions

¹⁰ Frauke Petry (maiden surname Marquardt) was born 1 June 1975 in Dresden. She grew up in Saxony and in 1992 her family moved to Bergkamen in Westphalia. Petry owned her first degree in chemistry at the University of Reading in 1998 and before attending the University of Göttingen she gained a doctoral degree there in 2004. Source:

<https://www.alternativefuer.de/partei/bundesvorstand/>

¹¹ Jörg Meuthen was born in July 29, 1961 in Essen. He studied at the University of Mainz and worked as a researcher at the Department of Finance at University of Cologne. After completing his PhD in 1993 he became a speaker at the Hesse Ministry of Finance in Wiesbaden. He is also a professor for political economy and finance at the Academy of Kehl. Meuthen was top candidate for the AfD at the Baden-Württemberg state election of 2016 and is since March 2016 a Member of Parliament. <http://jmeuthen.de/lebenslauf/> and <http://www.hs-kehl.de/hochschule/fakultaeten/alle-lehrenden/prof-dr-joerg-meuthen/>

¹² Source: <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/landtagswahlen-2016-in-der-blitzanalyse-afd-triumph-cdu-debakel-a-1082090.html>

and worries. Frauke Petry stated that AfD is originally a child of Merkel's politics: „That is what describes us best. We are here because Merkel's government failed to deal with important topics of society in Germany and Europe.”¹³ Moreover, according to the article (*Frauke Petry: meet the smiling new face of Germany's far-right*) of Peter Foster (Europe Editor in Leipzig of The Telegraph) “a hint of what those topics might be - at least in the view of some members of the AfD – could be found last week in a leaked draft party manifesto which contained a hotch-potch of policies, centred around a return to “national values”. These includes incentivising German women to have three or more children, locking up “therapy-resistant” drug addicts and psychiatric cases, a flat 20 per cent tax, as well as several evidently anti-Muslim policies such as a ban on male circumcision, minarets and wearing the niqab. Mrs Petry, who speaks fluent English learned while studying for an undergraduate chemistry degree at Reading University, waves away the leaked document as “nothing official”, explaining away its rougher edges as the work of a few unauthorised individuals - “God knows who”. Dismissing such voices as unrepresentative is Mrs Petry's main strategy when dealing with AfD's darker side, like Björn Höcke, the AfD's leader in the eastern state of Thuringia, who has echoed Adolf Hitler in calling for a “thousand-year” Germany and made pronouncements on what he calls the differing “reproduction strategies” of European and African people. It is the kind of language that has led Sigmar Gabriel, the leader of the Social Democrats (SDP) to characterise the AfD's ideas and language as a “a fatal reminder of the vocabulary used in the 1920 and 1930s”. But Mrs Petry, who in January 2015 found common cause with Germany's overtly anti-Muslim Pegida movement, denies the charge that she cynically makes political profit from pandering to her party's darker side, even as she officially condemns it. “No, no, no. This is not true,” she says, suddenly animated, “Especially Björn Höcke with his sayings about ‘a thousand years’ of Germany, that didn't help us at all. It damaged us a lot. We suffer from that sort of rhetoric.” And yet despite the official condemnation Mr Höcke remains in his post, appealing to the baser instincts of the party's political base – mostly old, white

¹³ Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/26/frauke-petry-meet-the-smiling-new-face-of-germanys-far-right/>

and male - that has undergirded its sudden rise to prominence. Still, on some controversial aspects, like the “three-child policy” to encourage the production of more German babies and defuse Germany’s demographic time-bomb, Mrs Petry is unapologetic. “If you call our policy stupid, then please tell me what you call a policy that asks for more migration into the country to do something about our birth deficit?,” she says, “That’s as stupid as thinking we can solve all problems in Germany just by having more children – we never suggested that.” Instead, Mrs Petry, a mother-of-four who split from her husband last October after announcing she was in a relationship with Marcus Pretzell, an AfD member of the European Parliament, says the policy is a sensible search for a better “balance between old and young”, adding that fixing Germany’s demographics, “cannot be a question of importing population because we can’t solve the problem ourselves.” It is the kind of policy – given the correct gloss – that Mrs Petry evidently hopes can look both ways in a German political landscape fractured by Angela Merkel’s move to the centre-ground, shutting nuclear power stations and welcoming immigrants with open arms. It is a shift that has left a vacuum on the Right which AfD has rushed to fill. But the unforeseen scale and speed of the success of AfD – the party was only founded in 2012 - presents Mrs Petry with a familiar dilemma for far-Right parties all across Europe: how to find a policy platform that both satisfies their angry, disenfranchised grassroots support while remaining respectable enough to form a coalition with more centrist parties. The difficulty of walking this political tightrope is the only moment during our interview when that smile momentarily fades, as Mrs Petry shows a flash of frustration at how the liberal media and political establishment has, thus far, determinedly shut her party out of government even though AfD has seats in five of Germany’s 16 regional parliaments, and won seven seats in the last European Parliament elections. (Five later quit the AfD in protest at the shift to an anti-immigration platform). What the establishment sees as taking a stand for decency, Mrs Petry sees as the refusal of the political elite to recognise the legitimate concerns of traditional-minded, older, whiter, blue-collar Germany. She turns the charge of Naziism on its head, arguing that it is the liberals who are truly being illiberal – a trick also used by Mr Trump, who like Mrs Petry courts and

berates the media in equal measure. "The best we can do to learn from our past is to preserve and create a democratic and liberal society," she says, not a little primly, "Pushing away your political opponents, calling them 'Nazi' and 'fascist', even suppressing different ideas of society, calling anyone who criticizes this EU and 'enemy of Europe', this is losing our responsibility. This is giving up what we should have learned from Nazi regime."¹⁴ According to Peter Foster (Europe Editor in Leipzig of The Telegraph) Petry's party was condemned by *Der Spiegel* as a haven for "right-wing extremists and anti-refugee, Islamophobic rabble-rousers" but, much like Donald Trump's populist provocations in America, the remarks apparently did Mrs Petry and AfD no harm at the polls.¹⁵ Petry was made a source of vivid debates in January 2016 when she was asked about German and European border policies by a journalist from the regional newspaper Mannheimer Morgen. Petry initially answered that the German Border police must do their work by "hindering illegal entry of refugees." She then mentioned current German law which says that the border forces may "use firearms if necessary" in order to "prevent illegal border crossings". The reporter went on to move forwards on this thought in a tabloid background by speculating on the word "Schiessbefehl" that has a strong meaning for Germans: "order to shoot." Subsequently Petry had to make clear that she did not mention such a notion. Petry went on to reaffirm that no police officer "wants to fire on a refugee and I don't want that either" but that border police must adhere to existing set of laws in order to protect the integrity of European frontiers.¹⁶ Oliver Lane wrote (5 Apr. 2016) in Breitbart London an article with the title *EXCLUSIVE: Lutz Bachmann Accuses AfD's Petry Of 'Taking Fruits' From PEGIDA... 'If She Goes, We Can Work Together'*. Lane continues as follows: "The leader of Germany's Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA) movement has accused the insurgent Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) of stunting their

¹⁴ Source: The above section is a quotation of the article written by Peter Foster, available on. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/26/frauke-petry-meet-the-smiling-new-face-of-germanys-far-right/>

¹⁵ Source: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/26/frauke-petry-meet-the-smiling-new-face-of-germanys-far-right/>

¹⁶ Source: <http://www.morgenweb.de/nachrichten/politik/sie-konnen-es-nicht-lassen-1.2620328>

fundraising opportunities. Founded as a protest movement against the European Union and Germany's membership of the Euro single currency, over the past year Alternative for Germany political party has been enjoying buoyed polls and notable election results on the back of the migrant crisis. By talking less about economics and more about migration and Islam, the party has been able to tap into the very real concerns of millions of Germans. Yet this shift has brought them onto territory already very effectively colonised by the PEGIDA movement, a grass-roots 'strolling' group which takes its protest style from the anti-Communism movements of the 1980s. The group has a diverse range of interests but is primarily known for their opposition to Muslim mass migration and the dangers posed by the Islamification of Western civilisation. Now, speaking in a rare exclusive interview granted to *Breitbart London* PEGIDA leader Lutz Bachmann has spoken out on the often tense relationship between the two movements, and his concerns about the AfD's leadership and their dedication to fighting militaristic and political Islam. Speaking to *Breitbart London's* Raheem Kassam, Mr. Bachmann stressed there was potential for the two movements to work together, but cited the present leadership as the main problem. Speaking of AfD leader Dr. Frauke Petry and her defence of circumcision, he said: "There's a big time problem with [AfD] leaders... she said that freedom of religion, in the constitution, is bigger than the law to stop kids getting hurt – the right to be unharmed". While Mr. Bachmann has no problem with the practice, he stressed it should be up to an adult to decide, remarking: "Circumcision should be your own choice... At your 18th birthday, fine". Beyond purely ideological differences, Mr. Bachmann also expressed concern that AfD was affecting PEGIDA's ability to sustain itself financially, remarking they "take the fruits away from PEGIDA". Speaking of what would have to change for the growing PEGIDA movement to work with AfD, he said: "it looks like a big part of AfD is reconsidering Petry [as its leader]... If she goes, there could be a way to work together". While Mr. Bachmann may have doubts about Dr. Petry, and she has gone to lengths to distance her party from the PEGIDA movement which at the beginning at least appeared to be a natural bedfellow, she is certainly the most outspoken politician on migration in Germany.

Breitbart London reported last week on an English language interview with the AfD leader when she quoted a British academic and said: "One thing is clear: The immigration of so many Muslims will change our culture". Stating the massive demographic change Germany is presently undergoing enjoys no democratic mandate, Dr. Petry said: "Ms. Merkel simply opened the borders and invited everybody in, without consulting the parliament or the people".¹⁷ Articles presented in the above are clearly showing the intricacies of the addressed topics and a certain political and public interwovenness of certain debates in Germany. Stefan Locke's writing (*Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 25.02.2016) with the title of "*Pegida and AfD are the same*" is quite representative in this respect. "Who is marching for Pegida obviously also gives his vote for AfD: According to a new study among devotees of the protest movement, the Alternative for Germany is growing in popularity. Right-wing populists are managing in this way the spread throughout Germany. According to a recent study of the TU Dresden, AfD succeeds always better to gain a foothold in the faction of Pegida. The proportion of participants who would elect AfD today was of 82 percent in January; a year earlier it was still 58 percent, revealed the meanwhile fourth survey conducted among Pegida demonstrators by a research group led by the Dresdner political scientist Werner Patzelt. The proportion of non-voters amongst them declined from 31 to eleven percent. "Pegida and AfD are the same and have only different shape" said Patzelt with references to AfD rallies as in Erfurt, where the same public was to be found as in Dresden by Pegida. It would therefore „groundless belittlement" to continue to conceive of Pegida as local phenomenon of Dresden or Saxony. "Rather, it is the spread of right-wing populism to Germany." "Three quarters of the Pegida participants, and thus ten percent more than last year are thinking that democracy is basically advantageous, nearly 70 percent are unsatisfied with it, how it works in Germany and 83 percent do not feel represented themselves by parties and politicians. Patzelt speaks of a "self-inflicted representation gap of the establishment parties," in which the AfD takes advantage; 56 percent of those polled indicated that they trust the AfD; one year ago these were just 33 percent.

¹⁷ Source: <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/04/05/exclusive-lutz-bachmann-accuses-afds-petry-taking-fruits-pegida-goes-can-work-together/>

According to the researchers Pegidianer are politically obviously right-wing compared to the average Germans, nevertheless compared with last year it cannot be observed a "shift to the right" within the movement. So there is no evidence that mostly racists were come to Pegida, researchers assess that the proportion of right-wing and right-wing extremists remained constant at around 20 percent. However, especially among the young participants were increasingly radicals, which would be mobilized through the internet. Many protesters would have hardened until the internal notice against the Federal Republic; also decreased the willingness amongst the participants to incorporate civil war refugees and asylum seekers from 73 to 51 percent; besides there are among the followers less and less, who are feeling that even a peaceful Islam or Muslims are suitable to Germany. Patzelt said that worried men of good will have become revolted citizens by now. The naturalness to express clear xenophobia and Islamophobia has increased all the same a rough, occasionally aggressive attitude towards real or alleged dissidents."¹⁸

Now we are turning back to the experimental findings of Lars Geiges, Stine Marg and Franz Walter about Pegida. Here it is to point out that researchers presented a comprehensive study¹⁹ about the new phenomenon as the reader gains a deeper insight into the beliefs and habits of the core supporters. The main questions of the study are simple: What is Pegida? Who are the organisers of the movement? What are the main features of the association and what attracts supporters to it? Authors are emphasizing in the introductory section that their book is a "work in process" in the sense of latest key accounts on the phenomenon. They are using various methods, which profile is shaping both form and content of the eight chapters. At first they are dealing with the origin and evolution of Pegida, also referred to the personal background of the initiators of the movement. Media scholars and politicians were puzzled on the issue how this movement evolved. Not only (but especially) in Dresden where

¹⁸ Source: This article is a free translation from German into English (by Zoltán Eperjesi) of the article entitiled *Studie aus Dresden „Pegida und AfD sind dasselbe“* written by Stefan Locke in Frankfurter Allgemeine (29. April 2016). <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/studie-aus-dresden-pegida-und-afd-sind-dasselbe-14090416.html>

¹⁹ The title of the book is: Pegida – die schmutzige Seite der Zivilgesellschaft? (Pegida - the dirty side of the civil society?).

Pegida began, tens of thousands of people have been mobilized. They were going on the streets in order to protest against the "Islamization of the West" by chanting "We are the people" and railed against the German media with main slogans as "lying press". Obviously Pegida gathered almost twice as many "I like this" electronic notifications via the internet, as the parties represented in the Bundestag, "one of the few protest groups which simultaneously functions on the Internet and on the street."²⁰ In the following chapters, the viewer can read about personal impressions of authors concerning the "Evening walks" in Dresden. There are also a few photos with vivid and characteristic banners used by demonstrators. Authors are presenting the findings of a survey, which cannot be regarded as representative. In another chapter one will read that "the Pegida followers are not turning away frustratedly from politics, but rather continue to deal (unilaterally) with societal problems by having ideas how policy could be made 'better' in their eyes and even put up some reform proposals for discussion."²¹ Contemporary historical retrospect shows that it was really impressive that kind of firmness of purpose with which the various members of a petty-bourgeois conservative and not insignificant social milieu influenced each other and dominated public spaces (streets and places) as they also developed and established a new kind of public relations. Now they are represented on the World Wide Web. Such quick demonstrative actions have totally irritated professional politicians of the current governing coalition and some of them reacted supercilious and perplexed to the polarisations of Pegida. On the one hand, the movement was temporally and at the very beginning a surprisingly successful protest mechanism of a quite small core group, where key-members were sharing xenophobic attitudes amongst each other. On the other hand, organizers were addressing people on a huge scale already in the early stages via the internet and other media platforms. Such specific messages of organizers and key-sympathisers were mobilizing those disjointed groups of citizens who were absolutely disappointed with certain current policy guidelines, particularly of the Union and FDP. Furthermore, they were complaining about the main methods of

²⁰ Source: Geiges, Marg, Walter, 2015, 16.

²¹ Source: Geiges, Marg, Walter, 2015, 115.

official broadcasters and the influential German media in general. Turning back to the more radical movements it is to observe that this is the base potential of a young party that emerged from the electoral alternative in 2012. It was founded in 2013 and named Alternative for Germany (Shortened as AfD in German). The party's founder Bernd Lucke (economics professor) was chairman until July 2015. The party became polarised into two factions around May 2015, one line being supported Bernd Lucke and his core economic policies, and another internal group that was fully against mass immigration in Germany and Europe. Lucke has lost a crucial vote on the party's chairmanship against Frauke Petry, who belongs to the national conservative wing of the party. AfD fights for the dissolution of the Euro (currency) area and requests the return to national currencies, respectively the Deutsche Mark. Furthermore, the party seeks among others the implementation of an immigration law according to Canadian model and a stronger official support of young families. However, the main political direction of the party is still much disputed as there is no coherent program that can be really implemented at central and federal levels. Certain researchers are recognising right-wing populist tendencies in their demands; others (the majority) predominantly assessed it as conservative party of the middle class. Their electoral program is based on "flexible" Euro scepticism. On the contrary, generally leaders of AfD are supportive of Germany's membership of the European Union while maintaining criticism of the existence of the Eurocurrency and use of bail-outs by the Euro zone for countries such as Greece or other countries that are encumbered with high debts. AfD leaders are also talking about Swiss-style direct democracy being negative to mass immigration and against a supportive legalisation of gay marriage. The anti-€ party is growing quite rapidly and claims to have about 10,000 members. One of the most prominent supporters of the AfD is the former president of the Federation of German Industry, Hans-Olaf Henkel. The AfD was the first party that opened discussions with organisers of the Pegida movement. The chairman of the Saxonian state parliament faction Frauke Petry invited them to exchange ideas in her parliamentary office in Dresden on 7 January 2015.²²

²² <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/debatte-um-islam-gegner-saechsische-afd-fraktion-trifft-pegida-organisatoren-1.2288724>

Authors²³ of the Pegida study are asking themselves why the movement directly comes of Saxony²⁴ because everywhere in Germany the Pegida offshoots have had much lower afflux as where it was founded. At the same time it must be noticed that one finds no exact answers in the text of the study to this issue. Another question of the book: why Pegida is considered to be a right-wing populist movement? Because not only right-wing activist protested with Pegida, but in the meantime there is a considerable proportion of Nazis, neo-Nazis or other extremists among the participants, who are identifying themselves with the goals of the organizers. Moreover, there is no official demarcation from them. The fact that Pegida has to do with racism is obviously and also can be simply proved by several statements of the organizers (public speeches, Facebook comments and official interviews). Consequently it can be observed that Pegida is not pushed into the "right corner" from certain outside factors (media and authorities) as stated by certain leaders of it, but rather is true that that entirely voluntary positioned itself in this direction. Moreover, Kathrin Oertel (one of the leaders of Pegida) confirms this quite clear in one of her speeches (15th December 2014). "(...) we are all right-wing. We are pursuing right-wing policy, we are patriots, we love our fatherland, we love our home, and we want to protect this (...) ".²⁵ Attention should be paid to the serious perspective of the authors who are extracting key findings from the focus groups and their various interactions. Authors are also addressing the consequences of political alienation, but without to qualify or trivialize the problematic features of Pegida. Furthermore, the book about Pegida presents other remarkable issues as medial interpretations of the movement and the reception of it in other European countries. Finally, there is an explanation of the phenomenon in the context of cultural alienation and political incoherence. "Followers of the Pegida are representing...an identitarian instead of a pluralistic notion of democracy, because ... minority rights are playing a marginal role."²⁶ Interestingly, the Pegida- protesters are similarly dissatisfied with their democratic opportunities as years ago the

²³ Lars Geiges, Stine Marg and Franz Walter.

²⁴ Source: Geiges, Marg, Walter, 2015, 186.

²⁵ http://www.nachdenkenseiten.de/upload/pdf/141219_pegida_mitschrift.pdf

²⁶ Source: Geiges, Marg, Walter, 2015, 181.

Stuttgart-21 opponents as authors are remarking: "A good 70 percent of both supporter bases indicated unrestricted advocacy for plebiscitary designed communities." Such developments are leading to overview the main sources and bases of contemporary mainstream political principles.

To sum up, the book about Pegida offers the latest details about the movement that grew out promptly of a small Facebook group, which mediated a strong sense of rebellion, demonstration and misgiving acts regarding the current political order of the Federal Republic of Germany. According to the authors, one should indeed see Pegida as a subgroup of the German civil society. It is very clear that Pegida supporters are considering the current immigration waves as a threat to the domestic labour market and such oversimplifications that are based on vague fears against foreigners are transformed in forceful slogans, those they are making political capital of it. Conclusively, the book offers a first socio-political examination about the studied issue, but it also can be perceived as a journalistic virtual walkthrough that is weighed to scientific precision. Authors are offering several relevant information each embedded in multifaceted reflections about the evolution of society and of protest movements in Germany. Researchers were going out on the streets in order to summarize and dissect the addressed field of topics in their study being aware about an important aspect, namely that there is still lack of clarity about a lot of questions concerning the Pegida movement. This work has a message: it is not good to ignore the development of such phenomena as Pegida, because a similar construction known as "the invisible" in France has made strong the National Front there. It seems so that Pegida currently enfeebled by a mixture of factors, but the sudden emergence of the occurrence has simply surprised the media, the professional representatives of the biggest current German parties and the whole society.

The emergence on the movement can be directly tied to Lutz Bachmann. His moving cause to start Pegida was the virtual witnessing of a solidarity rally by supporters on 10 October 2014 in the downtown of Dresden of the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party in Germany (PKK) and their armed struggle against the Islamic state (IS) through YPG (Kurdish volunteers who are a self armed group to protect themselves from ISIS). This protest

was posted by Bachmann on YouTube on the same day.²⁷ The following day (on 11 October 2014) Bachmann founded a closed Facebook group named Peaceful Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident (in German Patriotische Europäer Gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes). Initially it was designed to protest against German deliveries of arms to the PKK.²⁸ The following citation is a brief official explanation that presents the complete report of Berlin dpa in order to see the backgrounds of the events. The report deals with the question of war on terror and the new German position. Thus, according to the account of the German Press Agency (Berlin dpa) of August 31, 2014 one can read the following:

“Germany delivers anti-tank missiles and machine guns for the fight against the terrorist militia Islamic State to the Kurds in northern Iraq.

Until now, it was a taboo - but now also Germany delivers weapons in a crisis zone. The Kurds in northern Iraq will be equipped in order to combat the terrorist militia Islamic State. On Monday, Merkel wants to give reasons for the new German attitude.

Germany delivers for the fight against the terrorist militia Islamic State (IS) on a large scale arms in Iraq - among them 500 antitank missiles well as several thousand rifles. The Kurds in the

²⁷ Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6aFr9GVE2c> The video is very short (lasts 49 seconds) and today has 15 likes and 16 dislikes. It was viewed by 2901 people and there are 9 remarks till now.

²⁸ Please visit the homepage of the Federal Government: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2014/08_en/2014-08-27-waffenlieferungen-irak_en.html?sessionid=2A082E971C03B111F5E97FA211F83671.s2t2

Content: “FIGHT AGAINST IS, German support for the Kurds. Germany is willing to provide the Kurds in northern Iraq with arms and ammunition. The government will decide on the arms supplies by Sunday, said Chancellor Angela Merkel in an interview. She will give a government statement in the German Bundestag on Monday.” Wednesday, 27. August 2014. Chancellor Angela Merkel and other government officials have in the meantime excluded arms supplies to the PKK by arguing that only Kurdish organizations should be supported, which do not question the existing nation-states in the Middle East. But this argument did not apply in relation to the PKK, because it changed his initial goals since years and renounced to establish their own state in eastern Turkey. Instead, it demands a federal structure throughout Turkey and broad autonomy rights for the Kurdish population in eastern Turkey.

north of the country should be equipped with the armaments exports. The list of weapons was decided in Berlin by a ministerial meeting under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU). The total value of the shipment of weapons is approximately 70 million EUR. The federal government categorically excludes the deployment of German combat troops. According to data of Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen, a large formation of 4000 soldiers shall be equipped until the end of September. "The situation in Iraq is –extremely critical", said the CDU politician. She reproached the IS with "remorseless brutality". Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) said: - "Our aid to Iraq and our approach against IS does not begin by arms supplies and dos not cease by arms deliveries."

Risk of attacks due to the change of mind

Up to now, such deliveries in crisis areas were a taboo in German foreign policy. The change of mind is now justified with the "barbaric" actions of the Islamists as well as a danger that IS-fighters carry out attacks even in Germany. Merkel wants to explain the new German attitude on Monday in a government statement in the Bundestag. The ministerial round decided in particular, among others the delivery of 30 anti-tank weapons of type Milan with a total of 500 missiles as well as 8,000 assault rifles of type G3 and G36. There are also 40 machine guns on the list. Additionally the Federal Government provides a further 50 million euro as humanitarian assistance.

Kurdish fighters are trained in Germany then in the area

The weapons training of Kurds should be basically carried out in Germany. According to the resolution, "if that is not practicable, then in the area of Erbil (capital city of the Kurds) or in a third country" Minister of Economic Affairs Sigmar Gabriel (SPD), Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (both CDU) as well as the Minister for developments Gerd Müller (CSU) and CSU leader Horst Seehofer were also involved in the decision. A clear majority of for the arms deliveries is expected on Monday in the Bundestag. The grand coalition of CDU and the SPD is for it. The left and probably the majority of the Green parliamentary group will vote against it. But the vote has only symbolic significance - the deputies do not have a real say in this case. It is possible that the Federal Constitutional Court will deal with the issue. Cross-party lines are afraid that weapons can also get into wrong hands.

The German government is also aware of such risk. Steinmeier wants therefore to make sure that in Kurdistan no arms caches will be created. The first six Bundeswehr soldiers are already on site in order to organize the distribution in Erbil. Several other states have already decided to support the fight against the IS with arms. The US and Iran are supplying the Kurds for some time now. France, Britain and Italy have adopted corresponding resolutions within the EU.”²⁹

At the end of 2014 there were numerous official and public debates on the issue presented above. The question was if by planned arms supplies to Kurdish associations against the IS should be considered the PKK as well, which was also operating in the Turkish part of Kurdistan and its allies in Syria? Indeed, these associations played a key role in the rescue action of thousands of Yazidis because they were blocked by radical Islamists on their escape routes. It is quite possible that the PKK has benefited from the delivery of arms. However, this circumstance raises another problem: whether or not the federal government indirectly armed a group, which is prohibited since 1993 in Germany and is on the list of terrorist organizations of the EU.

This complex issue resulted in further discussions, respectively politicians of the coalition were contemplating about a re-examination of the PKK prohibition. Lose Eckart³⁰ deals with the matter in a professional article (08.28.2014). “Politicians from the SPD, Greens and the Left Party are on the opinion that the PKK has changed. They demand to check the classification of the Party as a terrorist organization. The PKK itself serves as a helper in the fight against the terrorist militia named "Islamic State". The deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary group and foreign policy expert Rolf Mützenich said the FAZ: "In the context of the talks between the Turkish government and the leadership of the PKK as well as the impressive result of the Kurdish candidates in the Turkish presidential election, there is a chance for reclassification of the PKK." Precondition is a lasting rejection of

²⁹ Source: <http://web.de/magazine/politik/deutschland-liefert-panzerabwehrraketen-irakische-kurden-19260398> © dpa, the German report was translated in English by Zoltán Eperjesi.

³⁰ Staffer and correspondent of the FAZ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung).

violent activities of the PKK. "Therefore, the development must be observed here with sound judgment."

Background of the debate is the struggle of the Kurds in northern Iraq against the terrorist militia "Islamic State" (IS). Mützenich pointed out that the United Nations categorized the lines of action of the IS as "criminal terror". That is why the IS and its affiliated organizations were sanctioned. The SPD politician said that it would be logical if the EU would take similar decisions. The German government wants to support Kurdish fighters of the Peshmerga units with arms. However, Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) was excluding up to this point to supply the PKK with German weapons. The PKK has reached only recently the image of a substitute army in the fight against the jihadists. The co-chairman of the political wing of the PKK, Cemil Bayik declared the FAZ that the PKK and its armed allies in Syria had shown that they can "proceed most efficiently against the terrorist group."

In a recent report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution it is pointed out that the PKK "carried out hardly any violent actions in Germany." However, they are still recruiting personnel in Germany. In addition, Germany is one of the most important sources of various donations, which the party collects.

Federal Ministry of the Interior: PKK-prohibition "indispensable"

It is true that SPD deputy Sönke Rix thinks, that one cannot say to the NATO partner Turkey "from one day to the next" that the PKK is no longer a terrorist organization. However, in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, he did not want to exclude, "that one will talk with them in the long term." He was ready to say: "One has to eye them." He trusts German security authorities that they would correctly assess the new profile of the PKK. However, the Federal Interior Ministry excluded a reassessment of the PKK. It recognizes that there is "no objective reason to enter into discussions about the lifting of the prohibition concerning the PKK" - communicated the spokeswoman. The ban continues to be in force „for the sake of national internal security is still an indispensable regulation." The deputy chairman of the parliamentary group of the Greens, Frithjof Schmidt expressed himself similar to Mützenich. At least

as the Turkish government will be ready to talk to the PKK and will consider it as a political interlocutor, one has to ask if the classification of the Kurdistan Workers' Party as a terrorist organization should be sustained further on as such. Schmidt, who knows well the past of the PKK and is far away from exaggerated positive appraisal, told the F.A.Z. : "There are sufficient reasons to seriously verify the classification of the PKK as a terrorist organization." The PKK will play a role in the long term as a political player in Turkey, but in northern Iraq and Syria too. The PKK adhered to its basic decision to not to commit any attacks in Germany. Konstantin von Notz, likewise one of the deputy chairmen of the parliamentary group of Alliance 90 / the Greens, told the FAZ: "of course" it will be necessary to discuss about the status of the PKK as a terrorist organization. Over the last ten years much has been changed and for that reason, the views on the party need to be differentiated. On the other hand, Notz warned to use such a debate as a "lever" in order to give helpful reasons for arms supplies to the PKK.

Bundestag votes on delivery of arms

The politician of the left wing party and leading candidate for the Landtag elections in Thuringia, Bodo Ramelow, told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that it would be a mistake to maintain „the hysteria against the PKK". Although he doesn't wishes to sing "the heroic song" for the PKK. Nevertheless, it could be a false estimation to classify them as a terrorist organization. Nonetheless the Bundestag shall now vote about the planned arms supplies to the Kurds in northern Iraq. In this case, the assessment of the Federal Government about the PKK can be found indirectly in the resolution on the supply of arms to the Kurdish Peshmerga as well, which the coalition parties have elaborated for the special session of the Bundestag on Monday. According to the text, "arms supplies to non-governmental groups as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) are out of the question." The chairman of the CDU / CSU parliamentary group, Volker Kauder indulged the demand of Thomas Oppermann, the parliamentary group leader of the SPD; correspondingly, the coalition ought to submit a proposal in which the supply of military equipment to the "Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq" should be welcomed. Previously, there were concerns about such an application that it could mistakenly give the impression that

the supply of arms would be completely dependent on the consent of the Bundestag. In fact, the government decides about that. According to the text, humanitarian assistance for refugees in the region should stay in “the focus” of such efforts. At the same time, Germany should be ready “to a generous reception of refugees”.³¹

The above presented professional article (Immer noch eine Terrororganisation?) of Eckart Lohse gives an insight (German perspectives) in the intricacy of the war on terror. As one has seen, there is no possibility currently to reconsider the prohibition of the PKK. Certainly, it is not uncommon in politics that movements or parties, who were fought on this side, are equipped with arms on the other side. These are the rules of superpower politics. Therefore it would be worthwhile to ask what the interests of Germany in the region are. Friedbert Pflüger³² explains why “the energy superpower Kurdistan must not fall to the “Islamic State” as this would be a „geopolitical nightmare.” He introduces his article in the following way: “The recently started American air strikes and weapons deliveries to the Kurds, as announced by the German government, are both urgently needed. Should the “Islamic State” prevail, the terror militia would gain access to huge energy resources; it would be a Taliban with oil and gas.” Pflüger’s conclusions are very explicit. „There are several indications that Ankara could be something like a “good hegemon” for an independent Kurdistan: Erdogan needs the land as a buffer to the civil war areas in Syria and Iraq. He urgently needs the energy reserves of Kurdistan that are on its doorstep. And he has triggered a development with his politics of reconciliation with the Kurds in their own country, which could outlast him.

The central government in Baghdad has intervened in this week for the first time on the side of the Kurds in the events, namely by the approval of strikes of the Iraqi Air Force against IS- troops in northern Iraq. Perhaps it grows out from the threats

³¹ Source and ©: FAZ.NET, <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/immer-noch-eine-terrororganisation-koalitionspolitiker-erwaegen-ende-des-pkk-verbots-13122092.html>, the article of Eckart Lohse (Immer noch eine Terrororganisation?) was translated in English by Zoltán Eperjesi

³² leads since 2009, the European Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS) at King's College London and is managing partner of the Kurdish-German Business Alliances GmbH in Berlin / Erbil.

provoked by the IS, nevertheless still - quasi at the eleventh hour - an alliance between Erbil and Baghdad. But it is more probable that the aid from Baghdad comes too late and is too weak to keep the Kurds in the Iraqi federation. Apart from this issue, the Western support for the Kurdish region is a humanitarian and geopolitical priority task.”³³

The conclusion of Peter Nowak³⁴ in his article on the issue is even more thoughtful. “If now a speaker of the Federal Interior Ministry declares that a lifting of the PKK prohibition is not expected for now, the point is to maintain the pressure. Unlike suggested publicly, this issue is not about giving up the demand for a separate state, which was made by now. It involves the separation between state and capitalism critical contents within their policies. The point is that the Kurdish national movement is subject to that pressure in Turkey as well, because of Erdogan's neo-ottoman policy, which is mainly based on the principle "divide and rule" similar to the Kemalists. The coming months will show whether this pressure within the frame of the German and Turkish government goes from strength to strength.”³⁵

The following report of the German Bundestag gives a short overview about arms exports of recent years.

“Weapons: Less exports - more authorizations

Economy and energy / briefing - 06.27.2014

Berlin: (hib/HLE) The overall value of actual exports of armaments from Germany has declined slightly in the past year compared to 2012. This was reported by the Federal Government in its account on the export policy of Conventional Military Equipment in 2013, which was submitted as a / briefing (18/1790). Thereafter, the actual exports in 2013 had a value of 933 million euro and were lower than the previous year by 13 million euro. One third of the deliveries went to EU, NATO and equivalent countries of NATO. Main recipient among third

³³ Source and ©: German Society for Foreign Relations (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.) <https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/themen/geopolitischer-albtraum>, translated by Zoltán Eperjesi

³⁴ Peter Nowak is a freelance journalist for various newspapers as Taz, Jungle World, Express and the internet magazine Telepolis.

³⁵ Source: <http://www.heise.de/tp/news/Waffen-fuer-die-Kurden-2305207.html>, Peter Nowak, *Weapons for the Kurds (Waffen für die Kurden)*. Copyright © Heise Medien

countries were the Republic of Korea (274.5 million euro), United Arab Emirates (102.3) Algeria (59.1) and Singapore (52.5).

However, the value of individual export authorisations for military equipment granted in 2013 was substantially higher. This value amounted to 5.846 billion euro. 2012 it had been 4.704 billion euro. 38 per cent of permits concerned EU, NATO and equivalent NATO countries. "The high proportion of export authorization to third countries follows from extensive permits to Algeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia," writes the Federal Government. In the briefing, the Federal Government also takes position to reports according to which Germany is situated on the third place on the list of global exporters of military equipment. Thus, in the study „Trends in International Arms Transfers 2013“ of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Germany is situated again on the third place of the largest supplier countries with a market share of seven percent for the period from 2009 to 2013 in the international listing. The USA is placed on the top with 29 percent, followed by Russia with 27 percent. China is ranked fourth with six percent and France is ranked fifth with five percent. The government advises to "Caution" in the international comparability of arms transfers of individual countries: „Parameters and criteria, which are on the base of these studies and will be used by the production of statistics, are mostly too different to derive a comparison from this. For example, SIPRI has not operated with actual values of approvals for exports, but rather with fictitious values. In addition, just part of armaments is taken into account in each case. On the other hand, also goods are included that do not constitute military hardware and are not included in the international list of armaments."

The official German Report on Arms Exports contains not only detailed information about exports and licenses, but offers an overview on the German export control system as well as the guidelines for the authorization of military exports and overviews of disarmament conventions and arms embargoes."³⁶

In the following one will read a contribution that was originally broadcasted on December 22, 2015 (at 12:17 clock) in

³⁶ Source and © Deutscher Bundestag (Aktuelle Meldungen)
http://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/2014_06/-/285362, traduction in English by Zoltán Eperjesi.

Deutschlandfunk and it was taken over by ARD-aktuell / tagesschau.de.

” Demand of the Left Party

"No German weapons for Turkey"

There are scenes like in a civil war: in south-eastern Turkey, the army is fighting against the Kurds. More than 100 people have died in recent days. Therefore, the Left Party demands the stop the supply of arms to Ankara. There is a precedent case.

For days now, fights are romping between the army and Kurdish fighters. Government forces have started a major offensive against the forbidden Workers' Party, the PKK. Among others, there have been fights in the cities of Diyarbakir, Cizre and Silopi, - in the past week, more than 100 people were killed.

In light of this violence, now the Left Party calls on an immediate stop of German arms exports to Turkey. The measure would be necessary "because inclusively German weapons are murdering", - said the party chairman Bernd Riexinger. "The use of delivered weapons against their own population violates the NATO Treaty." He urged Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, to go immediately to Ankara to stop the deaths of civilians.

Is Markel's policy concerning arms exports similarly to Kohl's strategy?

A model for the ban on exports could be a measured from the year 1992. Back then, the government of Helmut Kohl together with Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had similarly imposed an arms embargo against Turkey. Even at that time fights against the PKK were the reason for the arm delivery stop. The Turkish state army uses tanks and water cannons in the military offensive. Around 10,000 members of the military and special forces of the police are involved in the deployment.

Germany exported for decade's weapons to Turkey

According to the Federal Ministry of Economics, war weapons of German production amounting to 14.4 million euro have been sold to Turkey, including 25 light machine guns. The government in Ankara bought for decades German arms. The conflict that was simmering since 1984 between the Turkish

government and the PKK escalated in June; - the peace process that was initiated three years ago has suddenly stopped.”³⁷

Since the peaceful revolution (autumn 1989) in the GDR that started primarily through the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig and later spread out to other East German cities, protesters were organising a number of Monday demonstrations at regular intervals in Germany. People were protesting against cuts in social services, against Hartz IV, against the war and against the railway station project Stuttgart 21. However, the number of participants on such rallies usually was not high. There were no big crowds of people: sometimes a few dozens, sometimes a few hundred people gathered together at various manifestations. Concerning the genesis of the Pegida movement it is to observe that a few days before its foundation on 7 October 2014 a group of Muslims, supposed to be Salafists, have attacked Kurds with matchsticks and knives in Germany as they were meeting after a protest against the Islamic State.³⁸ The same day, Yazidis and Muslim Chechens violently fought against each other in Celle.³⁹ Bachmann mentioned "the terrible events in Hamburg and Celle" as a further reason for the creation of his association. Amongst the sympathizers of the protest marches were not only right-wing extremists, populists and neo-Nazis, but also so-called furious citizens (Wutbürger) being full of uncertainties. They were mainly motivated by unjustified fears against immigration and the spread of Islam.

The Pegida movement has really challenged the German society because there were strong anti-Islam protests by the end of 2014 and the start of 2015. For weeks before the start of 2015, the Pegida was demonstrating against the assumed infiltration of uninvited aliens in German society through Islam. Pegida

³⁷ Source and ©: ARD-aktuell / <http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/linkspartei-waffen-tuerkei-101.html>, traduction in English by Zoltán Eperjesi

³⁸ Source: <https://www.rt.com/news/194060-germany-kurds-muslims-brawls/>

³⁹ Source: <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/author/Soeren+Kern>, <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4780/hamburg-holy-war>, <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/krawalle-zwischen-kurden-und-salafisten-der-is-konflikt-schwappt-nach-deutschland-ueber/10811906.html> (In: *Der Tagesspiegel*, 8. Oktober 2014.) and Stefan Locke: *Die neue Wut aus dem Osten*. In: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 7. December 2014. <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/pegida-bewegung-gegen-islamisierung-des-abendlandes-13306852.html>.

followers are afraid of Islamic terror in order to alienate public opinion against refugees and foreigners. The leaders of the movement declared that authorities and the media started a defamation campaign against their collective actions. Organisers and followers of the Pegida alliance are defining themselves as citizen's movement and they are officially dissociating themselves from right wing activist.

Since October 20, 2014 the Pegida movement called the people for a weekly "evening walk" (Abendspaziergang) on Mondays in the city centre of Dresden. There were 350 participants mobilized on the first gathering and after that the number of supporters was weekly growing. Pegida supporters held again demonstrations on Monday (5 January 2014) evening in Cologne, Kassel, Hamburg and Berlin. According to initial estimates, 10,000 persons were participating on the streets in Dresden, in Cologne and Berlin. On the other hand, news indicated that only a few hundred Pegida supporters have joined the demonstrations. The climax of the protests was on 12 January 2015 as their number achieved 25,000 protesters. Rapid mobilization happened via the internet as in certain cases of the Arab Spring. Organisers have called for protest among other things through the official Pegida page at Facebook. Right there, the movement achieved about 183,623 fans in the meantime and 30,484 are talking about the issue (data of 23.12.2015).⁴⁰ Thus, it is to notice that the internet and especially some social networks were key tools for the mobilization tolls of this movement. Especially Facebook with its various options for group formation and message sharing facilities can be seen as a decisive factor as main communication device between organisers and supporters. Indeed, it offers the possibility to create profiles and sites in which people can interact on a large scale and at very low costs. On the other hand, it is to observe that messages need to be distributed effectively. Exactly these tasks were quite well managed by Pegida organisers and besides they were getting strong and prompt networking support by the populists and other actors of the right-wing scene. Regardless of whether it was the Pro NRW, NPD, large parts of AfD or other right-wing associations, all these formations rapidly recognised the opportunity of new information sharing and used it as working

⁴⁰ Source: <https://www.facebook.com/pegidaevdresden/likes>

platform in order to promote their own interests, as well. For example, the call of the NPD for demonstrations named “Bogida” in Bonn by the application of pervasive and various means of the Pegida occurrence. A simple analysis of the stream of information on the Facebook site of Pegida clearly shows the amalgamation scheme and rapid process of the mentioned circumstances. Thus, a broad range of various activists have worked in a more or less cohesive digital and real-life frame in order to transmit key messages. However, it remains rather unclear against what or for what exactly they were demonstrating together, because related to exact goals it is to observe that each participant declared something different. The Pegida movement itself protests among other things against contemporary occurrences as for example against current political bosses, against the current democracy, against asylum seeker, against Berlin’s and Brussels Moscow-policy and against “liar’s press” (Lügenpresse).⁴¹ This catchword was already used within the Nazi propaganda and it was deliberately chosen by organizers to direct it against those (working in the media) who dared to write critical remarks about the Pegida (association). As the initiators of Pegida published a position paper (Positionspapier)⁴² on 10 December 2014 on Facebook, which was a dateless and unsigned one-page manifesto of 19 bulleted position statements, supporters started to discuss it, respectively whether one should or not be identified with the declared objectives. Consequently, it can be observed that the wide range of different movements, which were meeting and clashing together their different ideas mainly within virtual interface contexts (internet and media), could also lead to the breakup of the Pegida association. Certainly, the movement’s main ideology is still quite unclear. The published position paper is moderately formulated at first view, but on closer examination, it is to see that organisers are keeping to their basic attitude. Contents of public speeches of leaders as Lutz Bachmann or Kathrin Oertel are proving this.⁴³ However, public resistance was

⁴¹ The term dates back to World War I and was contaminated by the Nazis.

Source: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-islam-protests-idUSKBN0KM21F20150113>

⁴² To see the political positions (19 points) of the Pegida movement please see the appendix.

⁴³ http://www.nachdenkenseiten.de/upload/pdf/141219_pegida_mitschrift.pdf

never taking such large dimensions as in 2014/15 in Germany. While in Dresden thousands of Pegida-followers were going to the streets, a strong counter-movement was taking shape. Moreover, counter-demonstrations witnessed a much higher number of participants: cities as Berlin, Cologne and Dresden experienced many thousands of citizens opposing the right-wing extremists. Besides, a counter-movement was formed on the web as well. Initiators of “Pegidawatch” created virtual profiles by contrast on Facebook and Twitter. The main task of Pegidawatch is to report accurately about the changing backgrounds of Pegida. The Twitter community denotes its tweets on the issue with the hash tag #nopegida. Dario Sarmadi,⁴⁴ presented the critical situation in his article in the light of the new wave of anti-Islamic demonstrations organised by Pegida. Leading migration researchers issued a warning by pointing out that current state of affairs could have caused a dangerous split in the German society. Migration specialists offered a new formula in order to prevent serious societal cleavage by stressing the circumstance that Germany needs a completely new image. Experts also suggested that the time has come for politicians to implement practical means against dangerous societal division. According to researchers, the Pegida association is based on a strong scepticism of democracy, and a feeling of weakness toward political elites, but also a passionate wish for a strong national identity.

Consequently, the new socio-political developments and conditions are showing that Germany's image has to be reinterpreted in which grave distortions can be treated in due form and time. The account of Martin Debes on the Berliner Morgenpost (30.04.2016) shows what happened on the Party conference of AfD. ⁴⁵ The article has the title *In Stuttgart the AfD adjures on its fragile unity*. “AfD was trying to give his first program at the party conference. Day 1 was disturbed by riots and dominated by formalities. Stuttgart. The stage is enlightened with blue lights as the party’s colour, which appointed himself the

⁴⁴ Author of the article of EurActiv is Dario Sarmadi and it was translated by Erika Körner.

⁴⁵ Source: *Party conference in Stuttgart: the Deputy of AfD, Alexander Gauland calls for unity by Martin Debes, translated into English by Zoltán Eperjesi*. <http://www.morgenpost.de/politik/inland/article207499961/In-Stuttgart-beschwoert-die-AfD-ihre-bruechige-Geschlossenheit.html>

"Alternative". It appeared on the scene: Alexander Gauland, 75, the former Hessian State Chancellor of the CDU, currently he is the deputy chairman of the AfD. He is responsible for the pathos. This weekend it is about, he exclaims, "the future of the party, to the future of Germany, the future of Europe". The hope of millions of voters is directed to the AfD. The 15 percent achieved in the regional elections in Baden-Württemberg, the strong 12 percent in Rhineland-Palatinate and more than 24 percent in Saxony-Anhalt were a success, which teaches fear in the meantime to the established parties. Thank goodness." Booming applause.

Party conference of the superlatives

Indeed, this Saturday has started a Party conference of the superlatives in Stuttgart, at least for an organization that exists not more than since three years. More than 2,000 people - there are mainly middle- and mature years aged men - who have gathered in the exhibition hall of Stuttgart. That is ten percent of the total membership. Additionally, there are sitting hundreds of so-called patrons, guests and journalists in the hall. They all negotiated about the first basic program of the AfD. The draft of the board has 78 pages, plus there are 1611 pages of amendments. It's all there, by what the party is defined so as an alternative from the reversal of the energy policy to the abolition of gender research and the ban on minarets. The party meets as in a fortress. The square in front of the exhibition centre, where party and national flags are flying at high masts, is locked with steel bars and razor wire. The police can be seen everywhere in heavy gear, water cannons are at place, a helicopter circles above the area. About 1,000 officers are on mission there. Just as many counter-demonstrators can be counted, many are young, clothed in black and ready to use violence and they are trying to block the entrances. Car tires are burning on a nearby federal highway, a track of the A8 motorway is occupied for a short time. The police take around 500 demonstrators in custody and let them free again on Saturday night in small groups. "However, we will continue to keep the group of persons in mind," said a police spokesman. They are the reason why the political convention starts in the morning with delays, whereby even after that hardly goes forward. They are arguing as on the agenda for two hours and about the point if only the official draft should be the basis of the

debate. Finally, there is only a bare majority for it. Even otherwise, the party is not anymore so as it wants to appear to the outside world. Since his electoral success in Baden-Württemberg is state leader Jörg Meuthen, who officiates also as a Federal Chairman, clearly strengthened whilst his co-Federal chief Frauke Petry looks increasingly isolated. The disagreement with her press secretary, a very personal double interview with her new partner – and federal head of North Rhine-Westphalia – Marcus Pretzell and attacks on other board members: all this has taken sympathies. That is why the party leadership tried to show unity in Stuttgart. Already on the evening before, on the press reception Meuthen has greeted Petry with kisses and told that all the feuds that would "imputed" her were pure nonsense.

Petry and Gauland didn't say a word to each other

However, it was easy to see who is really communicative - and who not. Even as Petry and Gauland were standing a few meters away from each other, they did not talk. She established no contact with the chairman of Thuringia, Björn Höcke or with the election winner of Saxony-Anhalt, André Poggenburg. After finally they were agreeing upon the agenda on Saturday afternoon, the two national chairmen have tried once again to evoke unity. There were differences of opinion, this is true, says Meuthen, but that has nothing to do with disunity. There will be never a party conference like last summer in Essen as one wing seceded around the former federal head Bernd Lucke. The alleged rightward shift was caused because of this, - she shouts. There is a "massive defamation" of the party and "dehumanization" of its protagonists. She declares the AfD the only real opposition. "But we have of course not the perspective of an eternal opposition." Because then all voters who were waiting for a change of course could be disappointed "and those who trust us that we as a party - when the time comes -, we will choose the right moment the right moment for it."

Höcke appears only at noon

At the same time, the chairman has criticized, without naming names, those who served as „door openers for needless medial debates". She appeals almost pleadingly: "We need you as loyal members just as you need us as loyal representatives in the public." It is striking that the auditorium simply politely applauded her, while Meuthen has been celebrated frenetically.

The professor of economics gives the audience what they really want to hear. "We want to be major party and shape the history of our country in the longer term," he exclaims, "get away from the left red green infested Germany of the '68". He receives standing ovations. Petry has to know at least now with whom she has to do when it comes to the top candidate for the Bundestag elections in the autumn. Even the Thuringian Höcke makes in an idiosyncratic way clear that he stays ready. He appears at midday and strides, accompanied by camera teams, the aisle to the stage. As he sits down among the Thuringian members in the rows of chairs, from applause aside one will hear loud "Höcke" calls as well. The next hours will pass in the argument over whether the Land Association Saarland should be dissolved. It was proven that the local board has had contacts with the NPD. In the end a majority upheld the decision of the party leadership, which is still before the Arbitration Court. The majority is extremely tight. Thereafter, the program debate can begin."⁴⁶

The refugee's crisis in Germany

By addressing the refugee's crisis in the Federal Republic of Germany one has to take a closer look at certain facts to asylum and immigration. Who is eligible for asylum or refugee status? According to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees of Germany (BAMF) persons persecuted on political basis are eligible for asylum.

The right of political asylum has constitutional rank (Article 16a of the Basic Law) in Germany: the Bundestag has decided with approval of the Bundesrat the asylum procedure acceleration law (Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz). The draft law has been executed in Berlin on 20.10.2015 and has 15 articles. Simultaneously it has been announced on the 23.10.2015 in the Federal law journal⁴⁷ (Bundesgesetzblatt) and it is effective therefore from 24.10.2015. It was signed by Federal President Joachim Gauck, Federal Chancellor Dr. Angela Merkel, Federal Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizière, Federal Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble, Federal Minister of Labour and

⁴⁶ Source: The entire article of Martin Debes (Berliner Morgenpost) was translated into English by Zoltán Eperjesi

<http://www.morgenpost.de/politik/inland/article207499961/In-Stuttgart-beschwoert-die-AfD-ihre-bruechige-Geschlossenheit.html>

⁴⁷ Bundesgesetzblatt, 2015, 1722- 1735.

Social Affairs Andrea Nahles, Federal Minister for Families Manuela Schwesig, Federal Minister of Health Hermann Gröhe and Federal Minister for the Environment Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety Barbara Hendricks.

These legislative initiatives are showing that Germany fully reconfirms constitutionality and such basic rights as freedom, democracy and justice. It is to see that the role of research by understanding and tackling the migration challenge is rather limited by now, but the good news is that in countries where the rule of law functions well, there is a possibility to deepen the field of topics. It is true that social scientists and demographers cannot make realistic predictions about current migration flows, but there is a need to take a closer look on the history of migration in Germany. In recent years, the proportion of people with an immigrant background has increased.⁴⁸ Accordingly, the study of the historical development of the German society is more relevant than ever: for example in 2011, 80.3 million inhabitants lived in Germany and 15.96 million from these persons had an immigrant background. Thus, the share of people with an immigrant background of the overall population was at nearly 19.5 percent. For comparison, this proportion was of only 17.9 percent in 2005. However, according to data of the Federal Statistical Office for the year 2014 there were approximately 80.9 million inhabitants in Germany of which around 16.4 million have had a migration background (immigrants and their descendants). Therefore, from the total of 16.4 million, 9.2 million were Germans (56 percent) and 7.2 million (44 percent) were foreigners. Two thirds of the people with an immigrant background (10.9 million respectively 66.4 percent) were themselves migrants of first generation in 2014, inclusively 35.8 percent of foreigners having individual migration experience and 30.6 percent Germans with their own migration experiences. This group can be again divided into Germans with no direct experience of migration (25.4 percent) and foreigners who were born in Germany (8.2 percent). Germans having individual migration experience (30.6 percent of all those with an immigrant background) are classified into even immigrant (ethnic German immigrants (in German Aussiedler and Spät Aussiedler with a percentage of 18.9) and immigrants who were naturalized

⁴⁸ Source: <http://de.statista.com/themen/380/migrationshintergrund/>

(11.7 percent) at their own request. Germans with migration background but with no direct experience of migration (this is 25.4 percent of all people with migration background) can be again subdivided: in naturalized citizens (2.8 percent) and Germans having at least one immigrant parental unit or Germans with one parent born as foreigner in Germany (22.6 percent). The latter group represents for example, children of naturalized citizens German children of foreign parents or children of ethnic German repatriates.⁴⁹ In There were approximately 16.5 million people with migratory background in 2013, thus 20.5 percent of the overall population. This was still at 19.5 percent in 2011, but in large cities 46 percent of children had a migration background. However in 2005, the share of people with migrant background of the entire population was of 17.9 percent. It is to point out that term "immigrant background" is controversial in Germany. The Federal Statistical Office defines persons with an immigrant background as persons "who have moved after 1949 to the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, all foreigners born in Germany and all those who were born with German citizenship in Germany with at least one newcomer or parent unit born as foreigner in Germany." The term is used since the beginning of 2005. Beyond the official definition there is the open question of how a person feels or more exactly what the self-perception of those people is who are falling under this statistical definition. Around 1.2 million people immigrated to Germany in 2013. There were 797,000 emigrants at the same time. Thus, the migration gain for 2013 is of 403,000 people. This was the highest migration gain since 1993, apart from the year 2015 that breaks all records because the Federal Statistics Office on Monday (21 March 2016) announced that it recorded the country's highest net immigration of foreign nationals to Germany in 2015, totaling over 1.1 million for the year. The amount marks a 49-percent increase compared to 2014, which experienced a net migration of 577,000 persons. The German statistical office registered in 2015 under two million immigrants arriving in Germany, while 860,000 people departed again. Data is based on the records from January to August 2015 and approximations for the four outstanding months of the year. On the other hand, the number of

⁴⁹ <http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/28347/umfrage/zuwanderung-nach-deutschland/>

asylum applicants has already increased rapidly during the last years. There was a rise of 70 percent between 2012 and 2013. A total of 109,580 asylum applications have been made in 2013 in Germany. This number again increased by 60 percent between 2013 and 2014. Asylum applicants arrived in 2014 from Syria (23 percent), Serbia (10 percent), and Eritrea (8 percent). According to Lewis Sanders, author for Deutsche Welle, Germany's statistics office has recorded the highest number of immigrants in post war history as net immigration increased by 49 percent in 2015 and for the first time most of the arrivals were not from Europe.⁵⁰ In January 2015 official asylum claims were submitted of applicants originating from Syria (24.6 percent), from Kosovo (14 percent) and from Serbia (9.4 percent). Compared to other countries like Lebanon or Turkey, Germany offers very few people the official asylum. In addition, cities and local authorities are often not prepared for the arrival of refugees. The temporary shelters, rapidly constructed provisory camps or buildings in strong need of rehabilitation are often overcrowded and become semi-permanent solutions. There is a relevant issue, because close beside officials, professional workers; especially volunteer helpers in Germany performed extraordinary backing for immigrants in 2015/16. Generally the population of Germany has done an excellent job in order to cope with the crisis. Back to the year 2013 as 1.2 million people migrated to Germany 755,000 of those arrived, thus 62 percent were coming from the EU region.⁵¹ Here the leading country of origin was Poland. A further trend is the immigration of so-called high potentials: thus, from southern Europe.⁵² Due to high unemployment, particularly among younger people, qualified skilled workers are increasingly migrating to Germany. For example, the number of Greek immigrants, increased by 78 percent and the number of Spaniards and the Portuguese has grown over 50 percent in 2011. 50-70 percent of these young immigrants are in the possession of a college degree. For the first time immigrants from non-European countries outnumbered those from Europe in the year 2015.

⁵⁰ Source: <http://www.dw.com/en/two-million-germany-records-largest-influx-of-immigrants-in-2015/a-19131436>

⁵¹ Source: <http://mediendienst-integration.de/migration/werkommtwergeht.html>

⁵² http://www.bmi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/123148/publicationFile/9076/Zuwanderungsbericht_pdf.pdf

According to the account of Lewis Sanders on Deutsche Welle there is a controversial deal in order to cope with migration. The article is entitled *Two million: Germany records largest influx of immigrants in 2015*. The quotation of the article begins from the subtitle *Controversial deal*: "The announcement comes as Germany and other European countries struggle to cope with an influx of irregular migrants and refugees, many fleeing war-torn countries in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has dismissed efforts to cap the amount of refugees seeking protection in Germany, a move that placed her at odds with several allied lawmakers. The EU on Friday finalized a controversial deal with Ankara that allows authorities to return all migrants entering the 28-nation bloc illegally via Turkey." "The most important part of this deal is that it will end the business model of people smugglers and contribute to securing the EU's external border," Merkel said at a press conference following the agreement.

However, human rights watchdog Amnesty International slammed the agreement, saying it marked a "dark day for Europe and a dark day for humanity."⁵³ Andrea Rönberg reported (18.03.2016) from Brussels to Deutsche Welle that EU-Turkey migrant deal was done. "The EU and Turkey have sealed a deal to end the migrant flow. Turkey has agreed to take back all illegal migrants in Europe, and the EU has made membership concessions to Turkey."⁵⁴ At the same time it is to point out that the labour force is no longer sufficient in Germany to meet the huge demand of the economy and industry. The situation is quite similar with the time of the so-called economic miracle from the mid-1950s. However, the history of migration in Germany is much older and gradually moved from an emigration profile into immigration country. At the beginning, long lasting wars, religious conflicts, famines, political grievances and lack of social prospects in Germany and the region has forced the people to leave their homes. The population losses for the country were really huge in those days: according to estimations for the period between 1820 and 1920, around six million emigrants have quitted Germany. The majority of them immigrated to the United

⁵³ Source: <http://www.dw.com/en/two-million-germany-records-largest-influx-of-immigrants-in-2015/a-19131436>

⁵⁴ Source: <http://www.dw.com/en/eu-turkey-migrant-deal-done/a-19127595>

States of America. Nevertheless, the economic success of the German Reich in times of strong industrialization (amplified by 1890) led to the circumstance that more people were immigrating to Germany as Germans were emigrating. Foreign workers were working especially in the industrial centres of the coal and steel industry. The era of National Socialism and the post-war years have induced new migration trends. Accordingly, it can be stated that the (frequently forced) employment of foreigners was a tangible sign and characteristic of the National Socialist regime. Intrinsically, labour camps and foreign nationals who were going each day to work were an everyday occurrence for the local population. Indigenous people gave these circumstances no special attention. The indifference against the forced labour that was showcased during the post-war years typifies how little this act of cruelty was perceived as a crime by locals. The period after 1945 was also coined by millions of people on the road in order to survive or find safe refuge. The enforced migration of people from different backgrounds as refugees, expellees and so-called Displaced Persons or shortened DPs has again generated altered circumstances in the structure of the population in Germany. The continuous influx of DPs and refugees caused strong tensions and conflicts with the local population. Lack of means but especially the socio-cultural and religious differences of in-migrants caused most of the problems. The number of DPs and refugees began to decrease only in the late 1940s. Simultaneously, the need for qualified workforce increased rapidly and in a short time exceeded the capacity of the German economy. Labour shortage has occurred predominantly in heavy industry and farming. Accordingly, at the very beginning of the new chapter of immigration into the Federal Republic was the huge demand for manpower. The economic boom of West Germany exceeded very soon all expectations. Growth rates of up to 12 percent generated collective frenzy of enthusiasm: the German economy gathered unexpected speed. As a result, the Federal Government picked up the traditional employment model of the temporary recruitment of foreign labour force in order to adjust imbalances tied to labour deficit. The German Government adopted a "temporary measure" in December 1955 and closed the first "Agreement concerning recruitment and placement of workers" with Italy. Thus, thousands of Italian workers were recruited for Germany. Guest

workers were rediscovered as vital human capital in the federal state. Other bilateral agreements followed with Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965 and the last one of this row in 1968 with Yugoslavia. The unemployment rate decreased within a decade from 11 percent in 1950 to less than 1 percent in 1961. Consequently there are living even four generations of immigrants from various countries in Germany. This is especially true for Turkey that has given millions of Turks and Kurds as work power for the country. They contributed to the prosperity of the economy and they were shaping the West German society (for example in the Ruhr coal mining area).

Business, politics and the autochthon population thought that this will be only a short residence time of the guest workers. Therefore, no institution has developed serious social or infrastructural concepts, which were supporting or taking into account a longer residence of guest workers. The workpersons from Turkey arrived mostly from poorer regions and many hoped to get away from stress of poverty. Germany was a real possibility for these people but the work that had to be performed by guest workers in reality was heavy work. They have worked mostly in the chemical industry, iron or steelworks and slowly but surely missed the intimacy of the family, did not know the German language and often lived in isolation: sometimes in a parallel society. Until 1959 the first labour recruitment agreement with Italy has had little significance because the number of individuals recruited remained relatively low. However, after 1959 the foreign population was growing rapidly. As early as 1964 Germans were celebrating the arrival of the one millionth guest workers of Rodrigues de Sá (Portugal). Most of foreign nationals have worked as unskilled or semi-skilled workers in this period and notably in those areas in which piece-work, production line and shift work was available. Such kinds of jobs have been considered really unattractive among German workers. This situation enabled the rise of several German workers into preferred or more qualified positions. Thus, they provided a solid mobility boost amongst the core workforce but without taking advantage to the same degree of it. By comparison foreign workers were in formal terms equated to the German workers, but in reality they were restricted above all by lack of work

experience or the non-recognition of foreign qualifications as well as the lack of language skills: therefore, they were frequently limited to the lower wage categories. In addition, the German economic crisis of 1966/1967 aggravated the situation between Germans and foreigners. The Federal citizens became accustomed with robust annual growth and perceived the first post-war recession as deep incision in their self-esteem as financially strong members of a community driven by economic miracles. The resulting uncertainty also generated critical discussions about labour market policy at national level. For that reason, debates focused on the advantages and disadvantages of the employment of foreign citizens. This caused a legal prohibition on recruitment in November 1973 and the further increase of the number of guest workers from countries that were not members of the European Economic Community, was therefore entirely cut off. The oil price shock of 1973 was used as the main pretext in argumentations. Indeed, it was not more than a reinforcing moment and a convenient opportunity to reduce the number of foreign citizens in the federal republic. The Red-Yellow government coalition decided to take measures and to give financial incentives to encourage the return of foreign workers in 1982. Helmut Kohl announced publicly: "The number of Turks in Germany must be reduced!" They promised unemployed people from Turkey a premium of 10,000 DM if they return to their homeland but only a few accepted the offering. Turkish and Kurdish workers have compared themselves with a lemon that one is pressing out and its rind is now thrown away. This clearly indicates that there was no official or informal concept of permanent residence for people of non-German origin in the FRG. There have been no real intentions of integration and segregation was considered as own responsibility or seen as normal situation. An exchange with the other culture was basically undesirable. The German government simply wanted labour force - but as Max Frisch put it prominently they got human beings. Yet the desire that the guest worker matter would resolved by a reinforced return home by itself process proved to be unrealistic in the meantime.⁵⁵ For fear no longer be allowed to return to Germany, several guest workers simply avoided to quit the country. In view of that, something that was regarded as a short term or temporary stay of

⁵⁵ Canan, 2015, 12-59.

guest workers was gradually transformed to permanent residence. Moreover, foreigners started to massively profit from legal family unification measures and have brought their close relatives in the Federal Republic. The immigration in the 1980s was overall quite low, but the numbers increased again in the early 1990s and exceeded at times the highest rates of foreign workers immigration. The reasons for this among others were the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Balkan wars, resettlement of German ethnics and the human rights situation in the Kurdish regions of Turkey. There were also increasing numbers of asylum seekers and repatriates. In the course of German reunification xenophobic resentment were growing, which resulted in violent clashes as in Rostock, Mölln, Solingen, Hoyerswerda and elsewhere. A relevant question arises: is that an essential unprocessed communist legacy? The answer is a biased yes, because even in the western German society are several uncertainties concerning foreigners. However, with the considerable decrease in immigration from the mid-1990s, the open violence towards foreign residents has sunken. And what is today after the immigration boom year of 2015/2016? One reason for the declining numbers was the so-called "asylum compromise" that came into force in 1993. Since then, asylum seekers who originated from countries, which were "free of persecution" or entered the country via other ways known as "safe third countries" have no chance to be recognized. As Germany is gapless surrounded by such safe third countries, refugees who want to claim asylum have no chance to enter the country legally by land.

The Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz that is effective from 24.10.2015 has to some extent silently corrected the intricate problem. Even the year 2000 has brought something new as at that time started the shift from the concept of heredity to birthright citizenship. Therefore, dual citizenship was introduced in 2000. It allows children of foreigners living in Germany to obtain in addition the German citizenship. This showed that politicians found necessary to legalise the new understanding of citizenship. Since that time, this can be no longer acquired only due to heredity (*jus sanguinis*), but also through the birth in Germany (*jus soli*). Nevertheless, children of "non EU citizens" or states with which there are no specific agreements, will have to decide

after legal age for one of the two citizenships. Furthermore, the new Immigration Act (Act to control and restrict immigration and to regulate the residence and integration of EU citizens and foreigners) came in force by 2005. The German name of this innovative law is *Zuwanderungsgesetz*.⁵⁶ Consequently, Germany declared itself *de facto* into an immigration country. Integration has been defined at this point as statutory task.⁵⁷ The law should simplify the existing difficult procedures. Accordingly, from several residence permits, the even experts named as quite complicated, have been made two: the temporary residence and the permanent residence permit. Moreover, the law should facilitate the corresponding processes. Besides, it was for the first time that German language training for immigrants became legally supported. The aforementioned National Integration Plan has been implemented in 2007 furthermore the Immigration Act was changed due to EU directives in the same year and a third the residence permit was introduced. This was the "permit for permanent residence in the EC". Since then, may get so far even those who were only "tolerated" in Germany a permanent residence permit: of course if they meet certain legal conditions. Moreover, there were changes to the reunification of marriage partner. This must reach adulthood and be able to demonstrate basic knowledge of German. A background for these changes was the first so-called Integration Summit of July 2006.⁵⁸ Here participated Chancellor Merkel, churches and religious communities, the media, trade unions, sports associations, employers, welfare foundations and migrants. A trigger for this was the shocking result of the PISA study in Germany. This mainly said that the success in the educational system is connected with the origin and intra-familial educational background of pupils. The Integration Summit led to the creation of the National Integration Plan. In this case the focus was *inter alia* to establish a dialogue with Muslims. Thereafter (also in

⁵⁶ Source: <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossiermigration/56351/zuwanderungsgesetz-2005?p=all>

⁵⁷ Source: http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Artikel/2007/07/Anlage/2007-07-12-nationalerintegrationsplan.pdf;jsessionid=5F825CDFB268BEDA89526C65FEA38C92.s4t1?__blob=publicationFile&v=3

⁵⁸ Source: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/BeauftragtefuerIntegration/nap/integrationsgipfel/Integrationsgipfel1/_node.html

2006) the first so-called Islamic summit was organized. Here the Federal Government, Islamic organizations and individuals meet together for dialogue. Furthermore, since 1 September 2008, it was introduced a naturalization test in Germany.⁵⁹ In order to obtain the German citizenship 17 of 33 questions must be answered correctly. The test should help people on their way to integrate by “forcing” immigrants to confront with the German language, history, laws, society and culture. In addition, a higher language level was demanded than before. It is to see that beside other important qualifications higher language standards are more and more relevant in Germany. This trend shows that language skills are used as a key tool in the new German policy of integration. The Blue Card programme was launched in 2012. It should have made it easier for highly skilled professionals from outside the EU to obtain a work and residence permit in the EU. It is, among other things, criticized because of the high minimum wage level (66,000 euros a year). Germany is also a popular country for young people to study. Altogether there are 86,000 students in Germany who have received their higher education entrance qualification outside of Germany. Nevertheless, concerning concepts as integration, assimilation and guiding culture in Germany it is to point out that in fact, people are experiencing today the consequences of the failed integration policy before 2005 because that was rather a policy of disintegration. The children and grandchildren of the so-named guest workers were excluded from political participation. As example they were deprived of the passive and active voting rights or access to public service and labour. People, who were born in Germany or were living there for many years, were not fully accepted as part of society. Particularly people from Turkey were accused repeatedly that they are unwilling to integrate in German society. This accusation was mostly made by such politicians, who played a significant role and were responsible for the exclusion of immigrants from the German society. In this case exactly these migrants have offered a hand from long time ago to certain politicians and repeatedly asked for better integration. However, back then the German federal policy was not interested in a real dialogue with guest workers. The government was

⁵⁹ Source: <http://www.bamf.de/DE/Einbuengerung/WasEinbuengerungstest/waseinbuengerungstest-node.html>

focusing and on a policy of assimilation. It intended the adaptation of the people with non-German origin to a supposed German core culture although it does not provide enough overall societal approaches or sufficient tools for it. Moreover, the idea of a German core culture remains even today a fiction, because there is no one unique German culture. In the first instance, there are still living people of two quite different social and cultural systems, not to mention the terms of the history of ideas: on the one hand, people of the former West Germany and the citizens from the GDR, on the other hand. What is now the true German mainstream culture? This would be the key issue here. What exactly of the two simultaneous value systems should be part of the desired defining culture? How should small language minorities in Germany react to such absorption attempts? For example, the Sorbs are Germans but they have their own culture and language. Can this special otherness be included into the guiding culture? Furthermore, from a historical point of view it can be affirmed that Germany has never had a homogeneous culture. Since 2005, Germany formally declared itself a country of immigration. Not only since the formal definition of the Federal Republic as a country of immigration had the concept of multiculturalism witnessed an almost inflationary use.

The concept has been used for the first time in a political context in Germany at a symposium (church) in 1980. The term means the cohabitation of various groups on the basis of preservation of their own cultural identity by which the interaction with other cultural groups was absolutely desired. This model was to some extent the counter-model to the absorption of minority groups, which was rather propagated by conservative circles. Nonetheless, the notion of multiculturalism degenerated all the time more over the years to folklore or it was simply prettified. A vision of an idyllic multicultural world was predominant in which migrants were dancing happily together around a kebab skewer. The reason for this was particularly that there has been no "crossover of cultures" on a par, as this was not sought from the side of executives and rather the social, economic and political bases were missing too. In addition, the view on the foreign cultures was dominated by several stereotypes. For example, all people from Turkey were seen as Turks and Muslims as well, but this is not the case. Accordingly, the cultural

differences of the people from this country have been completely ignored. In Berlin about half of the people originating from Turkey are in fact Kurds. They have a completely different language and culture as the Turks: ethnically and culturally they are closely related to the Persians. Indeed, multiculturalism seems to be outdated today. It supposes the coexistence of different cultures, which are defined as homogeneous: so actually it propagates that they are constructed and do not orientate on reality. However, there is neither a single guiding Kurdish Culture nor a German. Furthermore, the primary focus by immigration lies on the culture of people of Non-German origin. Economic aspects of migration are hidden, as the economic constraints, which are prevailing in the home countries of immigrants. It is often ignored that fundamental conflicts between the cultures can be also explained by the fact that people are choosing themselves one ethnic identity that is then considered as the right side. But such an identity only works within a strong group identity and in this way remains even by extensive assimilation preserved. Multiculturalism emphasizes much too strong on the cultural aspect, without addressing the problem from a socio-economic point of view, but structural inequalities are prevailing among the social groups. Examples are the legal discrimination against foreigners or their disadvantages in the labour market. So which other sample can be chosen? Let's see briefly the model of pluralism as it is based on the diversity of social and political interests and does not rely on the coexistence of ideal-type cultures. It is important that the migrants have the same rights as the members of the majority society. They need the same access to education and the same opportunities on the employment market. This is not so much a matter of cultural differences, but it is about economic, social and legal equality. The "failure of integration" advocated by the conservative side or the "end of multiculturalism" resulted itself from the failed integrative policies of the last decades. Consequently, people of non-German origin and people of German origin do not lived together, but rather alongside one another. Due to the socio-economic problems there are real conflicts in certain urban districts and peripheries. One should not forget that this people migrated before 40-50 years to Germany, were paying taxes and then decided to stay permanently in this region. But it is to see that these people were

not recognized as part the majority society. The splitting up of the society mainly originates of socio-economic processes, which in turn are a result of political decisions. Until migrants and larger groups are excluded from political participation there is no chance for comprehensive social integration and the overcoming of cleavages will not succeed. Therefore, the economic, social and legal equality must be the base of a pluralistic society. Although Germany is de facto a country of immigration, but does not understands yet as an immigration society. There still prevail stereotypes and prejudices that have adverse effects on the living together in society. One misconception says for example that people are coming to Germany in order to exploit the social welfare system. Nevertheless, the facts are showing a completely different story: Germany benefits from the immigrants. They stimulate the economy, pay into the social budget and contribute to moderate the shortage of skilled personnel.

Appendix

Political positions of the PEGIDA movement (10 December 2014)

1. Approves the right of asylum for war refugees and politically persecuted people. This is human duty!

(“PEGIDA ist FÜR die Aufnahme von Kriegsflüchtlingen und politisch oder religiös Verfolgten. Das ist Menschenpflicht!”)

2. Advocates the inclusion of the right and duty to integration into the German constitution.

(“PEGIDA ist FÜR die Aufnahme des Rechtes auf und die Pflicht zur Integration ins Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (bis jetzt ist da nur ein Recht auf Asyl verankert)!”)

3. Advocates the decentralised acceptance of refugees and torture victims, instead of often poor quality refugee centres.

(“PEGIDA ist FÜR dezentrale Unterbringung der Kriegsflüchtlinge und Verfolgten, anstatt in teilweise menschenunwürdigen Heimen!”)

4. Suggests creation of a central refugee agency for a fair allocation of immigrants among countries of the European Union. (Central registration authority for refugees, which then similar to the inter-German, Königstein key distributes refugees to the EU Member States) and for its consistent implementation! ")

(“PEGIDA ist FÜR einen gesamteuropäischen Verteilungsschlüssel für Flüchtlinge und eine gerechte Verteilung auf die Schultern aller EU-Mitgliedsstaaten! (Zentrale Erfassungsbehörde für Flüchtlinge, welche dann ähnlich dem innerdeutschen, Königsteiner Schlüssel die Flüchtlinge auf die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten verteilt) und für dessen konsequente Umsetzung!”)

5. Demands a decrease in the number of asylum seekers per social worker from currently 200:1. (practically there is no supervision of in part traumatized people.)

(„PEGIDA ist FÜR eine Senkung des Betreuungsschlüssels für Asylsuchende (Anzahl Flüchtlinge je Sozialarbeiter/Betreuer – derzeit ca.200:1, faktisch keine Betreuung der teils traumatisierten Menschen)“

6. Suggests modeling German immigration policies after those of the Netherlands and Switzerland, and demands an increased budget for the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, to speed up processing of applications and integration.

(„PEGIDA ist FÜR ein Asylantragsverfahren in Anlehnung an das holländische bzw. Schweizer Modell und bis

zur Einführung dessen, FÜR eine Aufstockung der Mittel für das BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) um die Verfahrensdauer der Antragstellung und Bearbeitung massiv zu kürzen und eine schnellere Integration zu ermöglichen!“)

7. Demands an increase in funding for the police and is against job cuts by the same.

(„PEGIDA ist FÜR die Aufstockung der Mittel für die Polizei und GEGEN den Stellenabbau bei selbiger!“)

8. Demands implementation of all asylum laws including expulsion.

(“PEGIDA ist FÜR die Ausschöpfung und Umsetzung der vorhandenen Gesetze zum Thema Asyl und Abschiebung!“)

9. Mentions zero tolerance towards criminal refugees and immigrants.

(“PEGIDA ist FÜR eine Null-Toleranz-Politik gegenüber straffällig gewordenen Asylbewerbern und Migranten!“)

10. States that Pegida opposes a misogynistic and violent political ideology, but does not oppose assimilated and politically moderate Muslims.

(“PEGIDA ist FÜR den Widerstand gegen eine frauenfeindliche, gewaltbetonte politische Ideologie aber nicht gegen hier lebende, sich integrierende Muslime!“)

11. Supports immigration as in Switzerland, Canada, Australia and South Africa.

(“PEGIDA ist FÜR eine Zuwanderung nach dem Vorbild der Schweiz, Australiens, Kanadas oder Südafrikas!“)

12. States that Pegida supports sexual self-determination (opposes "early sexualization of children").

("PEGIDA ist FÜR sexuelle Selbstbestimmung!")

13. Argues for the protection of Germany's traditional Judeo-Christian culture.

("PEGIDA ist FÜR die Erhaltung und den Schutz unserer christlich-jüdisch geprägten Abendlandkultur!")

14. Supports the introduction of referenda as in Switzerland.

("PEGIDA ist FÜR die Einführung von Bürgerentscheidungen nach dem Vorbild der Schweiz!")

15. Opposes weapon exports to radical and non-permitted groups, such as the PKK.

("PEGIDA ist GEGEN Waffenlieferungen an verfassungsfeindliche, verbotene Organisationen wie z.B. PKK.")

16. Opposes parallel societies and parallel jurisdiction, for example Sharia courts, Sharia police and peace judges.

("PEGIDA ist GEGEN das Zulassen von Parallelgesellschaften/Parallelgerichte in unserer Mitte, wie Sharia-Gerichte, Sharia-Polizei, Friedensrichter usw.")

17. States that Pegida opposes gender mainstreaming, and the almost already compulsive, politically correct gender neutralization of our language!

("PEGIDA ist GEGEN dieses wahnwitzige "Gender Mainstreaming", auch oft "Genderisierung" genannt, die nahezu

schon zwanghafte, politisch korrekte Geschlechtsneutralisierung unserer Sprache!“)

18. Indicates that Pegida opposes any radicalism, whether religious or politically motivated.

(“PEGIDA ist GEGEN Radikalismus egal ob religiös oder politisch motiviert!“)

19. Says that Pegida opposes hate speech, regardless of religion.

(“PEGIDA ist GEGEN Hassprediger, egal welcher Religion zugehörig!“)

Source: <http://www.menschen-in-dresden.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/pegida-positionspapier.pdf>, accessed on 02.12.2015.

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